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Abstract
We argue against current proposals concerning the non-existence of time. We
point out that a large number of these proposals rely, at least implicitly, on the
assumption of ‘closure’ (or ‘partial closure’) of the laws of Physics. I.e. the assump-
tion that laws of Physics as they are known today are either complete (and hence
closed) or that they possess features that a hypothetical future ‘complete’ theory
must share (and hence are partially closed). Given that the assumption of closure
of laws of Physics can never be verified operationally, it cannot justifiably be used
to support the claim for non-existence of time.
Some approaches against time are ‘timeless’ at the primary level for the universe
as a whole. In these approaches time arises at a secondary level, mostly in the
sense of ‘time being abstracted from change’. On the other hand, there are other
approaches that deny the existence of time altogether. We argue that metaphysical
arguments of this type – similar to those based on closure – by implicitly implying
the absence of history, are by their nature circular.
1 Introduction
It has become rather fashionable to deny the existence of time [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
The idea of ultimate reality being timeless has a long prehistory among our ancestors [16].
Over recent years there has been a great deal of renewed interest in the question of time
in both Physics and Philosophy. These considerations have been varied and numerous,
so to maintain clarity it is useful to adopt a clear terminology. In the following we shall
employ time world-views to indicate metaphysical positions regarding time (such as the
‘block’, ‘Broad’ and ’solipsist’ world-views discussed below). This is in order to keep these
clearly distinct from the status of time in physical paradigms1 in which these world-views
are realized to some extent
Two key sets of questions considered in the literature in connection with the problem
of time are: (i) those concerning the existence or non-existence of time and (ii) those
relating to the mismatch between the notions of time in different theories.
Many assertions concerning the non-existence of time find their justifications in the
context of recent attempts at developing a theory of Quantum Gravity. In approaches to
Quantum Gravity, one is often interested in bridging between theories. The difficulties
then often stem from time not having the same meaning within each theory2 in its standard
formulation. Moreover, a given theory can often be interpreted with multiple world-views
concerning time. Thus one may attempt to change the formulation of one or both of the
theories such that the new world-views concerning time match. Many approaches to the
problem of time are indeed of this nature [18, 19, 29]. Thus for example if temporal issues
cause incompatibility between two theories, one might attempt to reformulate them such
that time is absent in both, or seek hidden times in both theories that are akin. One
could also attempt to reformulate both QM and GR as histories theories so as to bridge
the gap. Alternatively, one could try to find matching emergent times in the theories one
is considering.
Some time world-views considered in the literature are as follows: Timeless solipsism
(the most extreme of such positions, going back to Parmenides and Zeno), according
to which the ‘present now’ exists while the past or future do not. Thus this position
only recognises being as opposed to becoming. In contrast, there are other positions
which recognise becoming to different extents by ascribing reality to time (such as for
e.g. Heraclitus, who considered time itself to flow), or at least to a subset of properties
that are intuitively ‘temporal’. For example, according to the block universe world-view
[10, 11], which originated in the 19th century [12], not only the present and the past but
also the future (and hence the entire ‘spacetime block’) is already there. Thus in this
case there is no sense in which we can talk about a flow of time. This position is to be
contrasted with Broad’s world-view3 [13, 10], according to which the present and the past
exist while the future unfolds in time.
Finally, a position which goes back to Leibniz [14, 15] treats time for the universe as
1These are families of physical theories which each have their own notion of time: Newtonian Physics,
Special Relativity (SR), General Relativity (GR), or various more speculative Quantum Gravity programs.
2So for example, ordinary QuantumMechanics (QM) largely inherits its notion of time from Newtonian
Physics, or from SR in the case of Quantum Field Theory (QFT), neither of which are compatible with
GR’s notion of time.
3This is also known as the growing block, though we do not use this term so as not to give the
impression that it is a subcase of the block world-view, but rather a separate world-view in its own right.
a whole as meaningless at the primary level. This may appear to be compatible with
solipsism, but since it still allows change at the primary level, one could say with Mach
[17] that time in this case ‘is to be abstracted from change’.
In this article we consider some recent arguments for the non-existence of time. In
particular we shall consider:
• Block universe type arguments [10, 11].
• Arguments from so-called timeless Quantum Gravity programs, such as:
(i) The apparently frozen form of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation [18, 19, 20].
(ii) Page’s argument [5].
(iii) Bubble Chamber type arguments in Records Theory [21, 4, 9].
(iv) The emergent semi-classical time approach [22, 23] to e.g. Quantum Cosmol-
ogy.
Argument (ii) – and some arguments of the types (i) and (iii) – are used in various
implementations of the solipsist world-view. Such arguments are metaphysical in nature
and by implicitly denying history, they are circular and cannot be used as arguments
against the existence of time.4 We shall therefore concentrate on the other arguments
concerning the non-existence of time and point out that many of these arguments rely, at
least implicitly, on the assumption of ‘closure’ (or ‘partial closure’) of the laws of Physics,
assumptions that we argue cannot be made justifiably.
The article proceeds (in Section 2) by considering notions of ‘closure’ and ‘partial
closure’ of laws of Physics along with discussion of why these notions are defective. In
Section 3 we consider some of the main arguments in the literature for the non-existence
of time and show how they employ closure type arguments. Interestingly, closure type
arguments also implicitly appear in contrary settings, in arguments for the existence of
time. This raises questions about the uniqueness of such notions of time. We discuss
some examples of this in Section 4.
2 Assumption of closure of laws of Physics
Two key assumptions that are often made regarding the laws of Physics, at least implicitly,
in arguments concerning the non-existence of time are as follows.
I. Closure. The assumption that laws of Physics as they are currently known are
complete. Furthermore, given that laws of Physics commonly take the form of
differential equations, an additional related assumption, often made implicitly and
rarely discussed, is that of complete know-ability (in practice) of the underlying
initial/boundary conditions.
4To avoid confusion, note that in this article we use ‘history’ in the ordinary use of the term, rather
than its technical use in ‘histories approach’ to Quantum Theory.
II. Partial closure. The assumption that there exist ingredients/elements of laws
of Physics as they are known at present that will remain unchanged in all future
evolutions of these laws, and importantly will be shared by any hypothetical future
‘complete’ theory. In this sense they can be said to be partially closed.5
An example of arguments for non-existence of time of type (I) arises in the so called
‘block universe’ world-view (see Sec 3.1), while an example of type (II) arises due to the
difficulties that seem to appear in incorporating time in current formulations of Quantum
Gravity. In particular, the fact that no explicit time occurs in the Wheeler-DeWitt equa-
tion (WDE) (see Sec. 3.2).
In the next section we shall argue that these assumptions are not justifiable by sum-
marising a number of their fundamental problems.
2.1 Problems with the idea of closure
A key question in the development of Science is whether we can have closure (or partial
closure) in scientific laws at any given point in history? In particular, is it ever possible
to justifiably argue that our present understanding of the laws of Physics governing the
evolution of the Universe is complete?
There are a number of reasons why the answer to this question is likely to be negative.
• Scientific methodology. Given the nature of scientific explanation, theories must
remain open to future tests and hence possible modifications. The idea of closure
clearly closes this possibility. Furthermore, the assumption of closure remains oper-
ationally unverifiable at any point in history, and as a result can never be established
with certainty in practice.
• Possible Ceteris Paribus nature of laws of Physics. Even if we assume that
we know particular laws of Physics completely, it is always possible that we have
left out some others. This amounts to the possibility that scientific laws are in fact
Ceteris Paribus laws [24], in the sense that their predictions are always subject to
other possible (as yet unknown) laws being kept constant or ignored altogether.
Were this the case, it would compromise the long term predictions of the past and
the future. See, however, the discussion in [25] regarding the relation between the
stability of the laws of Physics, at any given point in history, and the extent to
which their predictions may be effected by their potential Ceteris Paribus nature.
In addition to these two potentially unavoidable sources of ignorance we also have:
• Partial ignorance about initial/boundary conditions. In cosmological set-
tings it is extremely difficult, if not impossible in practice, to determine precisely
the initial/boundary conditions necessary to determine the evolution of the Universe
5Clearly we are not talking about stability of approximate predictions of laws of Physics, which enter
into correspondence principles, such as for example the need for future theories to agree with Newtonian
or general relativistic predictions to appropriate degrees of approximation.
into the future (or indeed the past). This ignorance also plays a key role in bring-
ing about the additional unpredictability due to the possibility of chaos, discussed
below.
• The possibility of chaos. Since most known laws of Physics are nonlinear in na-
ture, the possibility of chaos (and sensitive dependence on initial conditions) would
be very likely in the Universe [27, 34]. This implies that even if the laws of Physics
where known completely, precise future predictability would require the knowledge
of initial states infinitely accurately, which is clearly not possible in practice, spe-
cially in view of unavoidable ignorance regarding initial/boundary conditions dis-
cussed above.
3 Particular arguments for non-existence of time
In the previous section we summarised some fundamental problems with the assumption
of closure (or partial closure) in laws of Physics. It is instructive to ask how these as-
sumptions in fact enter specific arguments for the non-existence of time. We shall do this
by considering a number of examples.
3.1 The ‘block universe’ type arguments
According to this world-view, not only the present and the past but also the future (and
hence the entire ‘spacetime block’) is knowable completely and in that sense already there.
On this basis, it is argued that there is no sense in which we can talk about a flow of time.
A key underpinning assumption in this world-view is that of total know-ability of the
past and future (as well as present). Clearly such knowledge, specially about the future
(but also about the past), can only be obtained if we were in possession of the complete
laws of Physics. Thus it involves an implicit assumption of closure of laws of Physics. In
addition we need to assume that we know the corresponding initial/boundary conditions
precisely. This is crucial, particularly given the extreme difficulties in reconstructing
such information as well as the nonlinear nature of most laws of Physics, and hence the
possibility of chaos discussed above.
In addition, to have complete access to the past or the future we need to make the
further assumption of non-Ceteris Paribus nature of these laws, which is clearly not jus-
tified a priori. Furthermore, there is a fundamental question regarding the observability
of such a ‘block’; as there can be no causally connected observers ‘outside the block’ !
Finally, the fact that blocks are pre-existing renders the block world-view particularly
limited as regards Geometrodynamics and emergent spacetime approaches which grew
from Wheeler’s arguments against spacetime primality [28].
3.2 Argument based on frozen equations
Some of the key historical arguments concerning the non-existence of time are based on
the difficulties in incorporation of time in some attempts at formulating Quantum Gravity
and the fact that some of these approaches lead to so called frozen equations which do
not explicitly contain time. E.g. the WDE for the wave function of the Universe, and the
way it has been taken as an argument for the non-existence of time. This equation arises
from taking the GR Hamiltonian constraint H and canonically quantising it by promoting
a subalgebraic structure of the phase space variables and the constraints to operators to
give the WDE:
̂HΨ = 0.
Here Ψ is the wave function of the Universe. The explicit absence of time in this equation
has been taken as an argument for non-existence of time.
A number of arguments have been made against this interpretation. To begin with,
there are criticisms to the WDE approach itself [18, 19, 20]. These include: (i) whether
it is meaningful to associate a wave function with the entire Universe, and (ii) whether
such a global concept can match our everyday local experiences?
Another important question concerns the extent to which equations such as the WDE
can be treated as complete. Clearly not all matter species may have been taken into
account [42]. Furthermore, time may be more apparent in one set of canonical variables
than others, e.g. passing from the 3-metric variables of Geometrodynamics to a set of
variables including York hidden time [31, 18, 19].
Furthermore, in using the WDE as a basis for arguments against time, a crucial
assumption, at least implicitly, is that even though we do not have a full formulation of
Quantum Gravity at present, the timeless feature of the WDE is prototypical and would
be shared with any hypothetical future ‘complete’ theory. This amounts to the assumption
of partial closure. The important question is to what extent do we expect this assumption
to be valid? To answer this question, we need to ask which are the features from which the
WDE inherits its time-independence and whether these are features that will be shared
with a hypothetical final theory of Quantum Gravity. An important ingredient of the
WDE that has been held as important in this regard is background independence.
So the questions are (i) does background independence necessarily imply the WDE
and (ii) to what extent is background independence expected to be an ingredient of any
‘final’ theory of Quantum Gravity?
The answer to these questions are not known at present. It is however useful to note
that background independence is a feature shared by Geometrodynamics and Loop Quan-
tum Gravity, as well as canonical Supergravity and M-Theory (but not the perturbative
part of String Theory). Nevertheless, we recall that regarding (i) Supergravity, for exam-
ple, has sufficiently different realisations of background independence that might render
frozen equations less significant.6 In this way, the Problem of Time can openly be laid
out as the quantum gravitational manifestation of the absolute versus relational motion
debate. Concerning (ii) we should note that if for example M-Theory turns out to be
holographic in nature, it could in some sense be background dependent: on a ‘screen at
infinity, upon which there are privileged frames’.
Finally, as a small aside regarding (i), not all background independent theories of
gravity possess a frozen wave equation. In particular, [30] contains a counterexample
amongst the higher derivative theories of gravity.
6Note that Background Independence has many aspects, in fact in direct correspondence to the con-
sequent Problem of Time facets [29].
3.3 Naive Schro¨dinger interpretation
Here we have in mind ‘Schro¨dinger’ in the sense of involving a Schro¨dinger inner product
[2] for computing timeless relative probabilities; ‘interpretation’ in the QM sense of in-
volving an alternative to the standard Copenhagen interpretation and ‘naive’ in the sense
of not involving the GR constraints, which limits this approach’s applicability [18]. This
approach involves asking questions of a subsystem or Universe with no reference to ’when’,
’how long for’ or ’whether that state is attained in permanence at some point’. This is
timeless in the sense of making no reference to time, rather than in the sense of restriction
to a single instant, and is not expected to cover all physically meaningful propositions or
investigations. Nevertheless, some elements of this approach resurface within some of the
approaches below, justifying its mention here.
3.4 Bubble chamber arguments
Bubble chamber α-particle tracks can be explained in terms of a time-independent Schro¨dinger
equation and can therefore be treated as ‘timeless’ [32]. This has been extended to provide
various timeless approaches to Quantum Cosmology. In [4], Barbour draws upon this fact
to argue for formation of “time capsules” in space, leading to a type of timeless Records
Theory; on the other hand, [9], Halliwell considers such tracks in configuration space.
Clearly one can also give an explanation of bubble chamber tracks within a world-
view in which time is presupposed. However, bubble chambers are carefully selected
environments for revealing tracks. In general, records would be expected to be poorer [7];
perhaps far poorer, along the lines of the Joos–Zeh model – of a dust particle decohereing
due to the CMB photons [36] – being a far more likely situation to encounter in nature than
a bubble chamber. In such a situation, records would be exceedingly diffuse due to the
information being dispersed by the CMB photons and ending up spread over cosmological
space.
3.5 Page type argument
The conditional probabilities interpretation [1] succeeds in supplanting being-at-a-time
by timeless correlations between the configurations of the studied subsystem and of the
clock used. Page subsequently considered whether becoming could be supplanted as well.
His approach [37, 5] to this question involves correlations within a single present instant
configuration which contains memories of what might otherwise be regarded as a sequence
of ‘previous configurations’. One might view such configurations as e.g. researchers with
data sets who remember how they set up the experiment that the data came from (con-
trolled initial conditions, and so on). In this scheme, it is not the past instant that is
involved, but rather its memory or record at the present instant, alongside the config-
uration of what would usually be regarded as the ‘subsystem under study’ itself. This
is an ‘in-principle’ scheme, meaning that no claims are made about being able to com-
pute these correlations in practise. However, Hartle’s IGUS (information gathering and
utilising subsystem) concept [38] may come to permit such calculations.
Page’s argument does not carry over to the GR context of the whole universe. It
can in principle only be implemented for the past events that one can have access to,
i.e. along ones past light cone. In addition to the difficulties in accomplishing this
in practice, we have the important added difficulty of how to uniquely reconstruct the
structure/inhomogeneity of the Universe off the light cone. Furthermore, and importantly,
this only applies to past events and not future ones. The crucial point is that future records
do not exist. It is this inability to precisely reconstruct the totality of the past records,
as well those in the future, which we call time! Importantly also, this approach cannot
be applied to the Universe as a whole. In that case the observer needs to be at a point
in the history of the Universe whose past light cone covers the entire Universe. At any
other points in the history of the Universe the records would not be complete.
Before ending this section, we should also note that timeless approaches – such as
the na¨ıve Schro¨dinger interpretation [2], programs inspired by the bubble chamber model
arena, conditional probabilities interpretation, and Page’s approach – are pretty widely
tied to nonstandard interpretations of QM. Such approaches either invoke the WDE and
so inherit some of its problems, or do not, thus risking the alternative problem of being
incompatible with WDE [18].
4 Closure arguments in Broad approaches containing
time
Interestingly the assumptions of closure or partial closure are not only used in arguments
for the non-existence of time, but also in some arguments for the existence of time. An
important example7 is that of Broad’s world-view, which assumes the present and the
past exist, while the future unfolds in time. In these cases the implicit employment of
closure or partial closure implies a non-unique characterisation of the future (and past)
dynamics, and hence of time. However, as opposed to the case of block universe, in this
case the presence of closure does not undermine the presence of time, but rather makes it
non-unique or approximate.
In this Section we consider various programs which can be argued to sit within Broad’s
world-view.
4.1 Classical GR
Broad’s world-view can be argued to apply to two commonly used formulations of GR.
Firstly, approaches centring on spacetime causality [26]. Observationally this involves
study of the past light cone. Secondly, approaches based on Geometrodynamics. From a
practical perspective, these are extensively used in numerical GR. Although the connection
of these approaches to Broad’s world-view is clear, the modern considerations of it in GR
only started long after the Wheeler school’s emphasis on Geometrodynamics in the 1960’s.
Additionally there is a Machian [3] interpretation of Geometrodynamics following from
a Baierlein–Sharp–Wheeler type action [43, 44]. The emergent time abstracted from
change here coincides with GR proper time.
7Almost all background independent Quantum Gravity programs can be taken to reside within this.
4.2 Causal Sets program
The underlying structure here [40] consists of discrete objects (the so called ‘spacetime
atoms’), subject to causal ordering relations under which the Universe model is a par-
tially ordered set. To be clear, most modelling to date have been at the classical rather
than quantum level: a classical world governed by causality, and yet with less structural
assumptions than those made in SR or GR.
Dowker [41] has recently argued that this program lies within Broad’s world-view;
where in this case ‘the block grows’ sequentially due to the birth of spacetime atoms.
In our opinion, the connection to Broad’s world-view is unsurprising, since that world-
view applies to the standard spacetime causality approach to GR, which the Causal Sets
program shares some common foundations with.
4.3 Semi-classical GR
Finally we consider semi-classical GR in a canonical sense and thus closely tied to Ge-
ometrodynamics. This involves interpreting the WDE within a regime in which a semi-
classical (WKB) time emerges. Furthermore, this also admits a Machian interpretation,
in terms of time being abstracted from semi-classical change which distinguishes it from
the classical emergent Machian time by having a quantum input [29].
5 Conclusion
We have argued against recent proposals regarding the non-existence of time. These
proposals fall into two main categories. Firstly those arguments that assume, at least
implicitly, the closure of partial closure of the laws of Physics. These include the block
universe type arguments as well arguments motivated by the difficulties in incorpora-
tion of time in some attempts at formulating Quantum Gravity, even though in practice
Broad’s world-view is the dominant one employed in the Quantum Gravity literature. We
have given a number of reasons why such assumptions are problematic as are arguments
that employ them. These can be summarized by saying we have time because we shall
always be partially ignorant. Secondly, solipsist type arguments, according to which only
present exist while denying the existence of past or future. We have argued against such
metaphysical arguments, by pointing out that their implicit denial of history renders them
circular and hence inappropriate as arguments against the existence of time.
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